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stream Christian theology" (p. 205). In a word, even if, contrary to what I have
urged, Hasker's arguments for incompatibilism were indeed compelling, it would
still be incumbent upon Christian philosophers to preserve the classical understanding of divine providence, which is a linchpin of the Christian Faith and of
the traditions of intellectual inquiry it has inspired. As I see it, this is the main
theological lesson to be learned from Hasker's remarkably provocative book.
NOTES
1. See Luis de Molina, On Divine Foreknowledge (Part IV of the "Concordia ..),
translated, with an introduction and notes, by Alfred J. Freddoso (Ithaca, NY: Cornell
University Press, 1988), pp. 75-78; Thomas P. Flint, "Hasker's God, Time, and Knowledge," Philosophical Studies 60 (1990): 103-115; and Rod Bertolet, "Hasker on Middle
Knowledge," Faith and Philosophy 10 (1993): 3-17. In fairness to Hasker, I should also
mention his "Response to Thomas Flint," Philosophical Studies 60 (1990): 117-126, as
well as the amicus brief filed by Robert Merrihew Adams in "An Anti-Molinist Argument,"
Philosophical Perspectives 5 (1991): 343-353.

2. For more on this, see my "God's General Concurrence with Secondary Causes: Why
Conservation is not Enough," Philosophical Perspectives 5 (1991): 553-585.
3. In "Divine Providence and Simple Foreknowledge," Faith and Philosophy, forthcoming, David Hunt argues that if we reject the claim that God has complete providential
sovereignty over all events, including free actions-a claim he stigmatizes as 'hyperCalvinist' but might just as well have called 'Augustinian' or 'Thomistic'-we may
coherently maintain that simple foreknowledge can contribute to "the strongest providential control compatible with there being free agents other than God." Perhaps. But Hunt
is mistaken in his undocumented assertion that he is defending the "traditional" position.
4. See Flint, "In Defence of Theological Compatibilism," Faith alld Philosophy 8
(1991): 237-243; and "Hasker's God, Tillie, and Knowledge," esp. pp. 112-14. For the
record, the relevant power entailment principle is this: If p is true and entails q, then if it
cannot be in anyone's power to bring it about that p is false, it cannot be in anyone's power
to bring it about that q is false. So given that (i) God's past belief entails that Peter will
refrain from watching the game and that (ii) Peter cannot make it the case that God never
held that belief, Peter cannot make it false that he will refrain from watching the game.
5. For more on this point, see Nelson Pike, "A Latter-Day Look at the Foreknowledge
Problem," illtematiollal Journalfor Philosophy of Religion, forthcoming.

Christian Philosophy, edited by Thomas P. Flint. Notre Dame, Indiana:
University of Notre Dame Press, 1990. Pp. xix + 226. $31.95.
WILLIAM HASKER, Huntington College.

Christian Philosophy comprises seven papers delivered at a 1988 conference
at Notre Dame, plus an excellent introduction by Thomas Flint. I shall comment on each of the essays in turn.

108

Faith and Philosophy

Norman Kretzmann leads off with "Faith Seeks, Understanding Finds:
Augustine's Charter for Christian Philosophy," a piece which analyzes
Augustine's conception of the relationship between faith and understanding.
Certain problems arise if we suppose, as might initially seem natural, that
faith is "a deficient cognitive state to be supplanted by understanding" (p.
10). If this is what faith is, how are we to understand Augustine's notion that
understanding supplements rather than replaces faith? How can an imperfect,
authority-based acceptance of a proposition coexist with a firm, rational grasp
of its truth? The solution to these and other difficulties is found in the insight
that faith for Augustine is not primarily "propositional faith" but rather the
religious way of faith, which involves commitment to the way of life implied
by Christian doctrine. Thus, "the aim of Christian philosophy as Augustine
sees it is to combine propositional understanding with the way of faith" (p.
18). Thus baldly stated, the conclusion is not particularly startling; what
cannot be conveyed in a brief summary is the skill and loving care with which
Kretzmann analyzes alternatives, elicits the intentions behind Augustine's
text, and draws implications for Christian philosophy as it is practiced today.
The doctrine of the atonement receives attention in "Justice, Mercy, Supererogation, and Atonement," by Richard Purtill. Purtill's central idea is that
the Son of God, by his voluntary acceptance of suffering and death, performed
a work of supererogation which made it appropriate that the Father, on his
request, should pardon repentant sinners who are otherwise deserving of
damnation. In developing this Purtill rejects "strict retributionism," which
holds that one "should never punish more or less than is deserved," thus
making mercy impossible. He also rejects "weak retributionism," which holds
that mere repentance is always in itself a good and sufficient reason for
pardon, thus making atonement unnecessary. But how are we to understand
the reason behind Christ's suffering and death? Purtill concludes, "It seems
that there is no real substitute for a theory of our incorporation into Christ
which takes our unity with Christ as a genuine metaphysical fact" (p. 46). He
does not go on to explicate the nature of this metaphysical fact; nevertheless,
his suggestions hold real promise for further work on this doctrine.
In "Providence and the Problem of Evil" Eleonore Stump places her own
previously stated views on theodicy in the context of an account of divine
providence derived from Aquinas. While this account of providence adds
depth and background to the theodicy, the centerpiece of the latter remains
Stump's claim that all undeserved suffering is a benefit (or at least, the best
available means to a benefit) for the one who suffers. The first objection
considered is, "This approach to the problem of evil apparently entails that
nothing bad-nothing really bad, that is-ever happens to anybody. But this
conclusion is wildly implausible." Stump admits the entailment, but replies,
"This ... objection is equivalent to insisting that the problem of evil is insol-
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uble" (p. 69). Such a response, I think, amounts to a rather abrupt (not to say
question-begging) dismissal of all those theodicies which do not affirm what
her own theodicy affirms. In any case, there may be a difficulty about Stump's
appropriation of Aquinas. Is she really entitled to help herself to his doctrine
of providence, when her account of how God is able to operate to accomplish
his providential purposes differs so fundamentally from his? She emphatically rejects both theological determinism (arguably the best interpretation
of Aquinas) and Molinism, and affirms what I have elsewhere called a "risktaking" view of providence. It would seem plausible that this might require
some modifications in Aquinas's doctrine, though I am not certain that this
is SO.1
Alan Donagan's contribution is entitled, "Can Anybody in a Post-Christian
Culture Rationally Believe the Nicene Creed?" The Nicene Creed functions
here as a specific expression of the historic Christian faith; Donagan answers
the question through a combination of apologetics with an account of his
personal journey of faith. He begins with a discussion of the development of
doctrine (considered as posing a threat to the claim that all of the church's
teaching is apostolic), and follows with some remarks on demythologizing.
He then turns to naturalism, and cites C. S. Lewis's well-known argument
against naturalism (or materialism) from Miracles as an example of failed
apologetics. (He subscribes to the popular view that Lewis's argument was
demolished by Elizabeth Anscombe, and does not discuss the changes Lewis
made in the revised edition of Miracles. 2 ) Should Christian philosophers,
then, seek a replacement for Lewis's (supposedly failed) argument? Donagan
thinks not; materialism, in his view, is really not worth refuting: "Understood
as the doctrine that nothing happens that is not causally explicable in terms
of the natural sciences as they now are, materialism is certainly false;
and ... understood as the doctrine that nothing happens that is not causally
explicable in terms of ideal natural science, it is something we know not
what" (p. 107). Here I think Donagan is mistaken. It is true that contemporary
materialism appeals to the future progress of science. But there are some
fairly tight constraints on what this future science is to be like: it must not,
for instance, contain any ultimate, irreducible, intentionality or teleology.
Materialism so conceived is by no means a will-o' -the-wisp, and the task of
refuting it is not necessarily a futile one.
The final, and in some respects the most impressive, section of the paper
deals mainly with the current state of biblical studies and their effect on those
who inquire into the faith. He has some severe comments on the methods
used by many biblical scholars, and remarks that "Accepting the Nicene faith
has been, for all I have talked to, in large part a matter of forming a critical
attitude to much biblical scholarship" (p. 113). In his conclusion (p. 116),
Donagan asks: "Why do converts to Christianity from pre-Christian and post-
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Christian cultures accept [its doctrines]? ... When they learn what Christianity
teaches, they judge it, if true, to be a remedy for their condition .... Their
verdict is, like Peter's when Jesus asked him, 'Will you also go away?' 'Lord,
to whom shall we go? thou hast the words of eternal life ...'
Next comes Nicholas Wolterstorff's essay, "The Remembrance of Things
(Not) Past: Philosophical Reflections on Christian Liturgy." Wolterstorff surveys a large range of materials relevant to the understanding of ritual, from
Mircea Eliade to Brevard Childs to Max Thurian to Edward Casey to Sigmund
Mowinckel. His central focus, however, is an interpretation of the human (not
the divine) actions in the Eucharist. His interpretation cannot be summarized
here; I will only say that it strikes me as surprisingly thin and unsatisfying.
Perhaps Wolterstorff would agree that a great deal remains to be said; he
concludes with an appeal to philosophers to pay attention to Christian ritual
as they have to Christian belief, Christian ethical action, and Christian experience. The point is well made, but the task seems to call for an aesthetician,
and we have few if any aestheticians of Wolterstorff's stature who might
undertake it. So it is to be hoped that he will take up his own challenge and
give us a book on the subject.
"Love and Absolutes in Christian Ethics," by J. L. A. Garcia, deals with a
number of related ethical topics. Garcia begins by setting out his own ethical
theory, in which (1) "a person's moral life comprises certain salient relationships or roles ... [and] to be morally good or bad is to be good or bad in such
roles as friend, parent, offspring, spouse, neighbor (in the scriptural sense),
confidante, informant, promiser, etc." (p. 163); and (2) it is love (interpreted
as benevolence) which determines whether one is performing the roles in
question well or badly. He then moves on to a discussion of intentions and
their place in moral evaluation, and building on this he presents an argument
that certain "moral absolutes" (especially, the prohibition against killing the
innocent) can be justified on the basis of his theory. Next, he defends moral
absolutes against some arguments of Scheffler, and he concludes with some
reflections on moral dilemmas, which he thinks should be excluded from
Christian ethics. Clearly there is a great deal of philosophical substance here;
far too much, in fact, for a single essay. But the ideas richly deserve the
further development they will no doubt receive.
Merold Westphal concludes the book with "Taking st. Paul Seriously: Sin
as an Epistemological Category." "Taking Paul seriously" means stressing
the importance of the "noetic effects of sin," an important theme not only in
Paul but in Augustine, Luther, Calvin, and Barth. The recognition of "motivated irrationality" is also prominent in a number of philosophers, though
most of them tend to exempt their own epistemological projects from the
general indictment. Westphal recommends to Christian philosophers a wideranging investigation which would pursue this topic throughout the history
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of philosophy. His most pointed criticisms in the present essay, however, are
directed at Reformed epistemologists Alvin Plantinga and Nicholas
Wolterstorff, both of whom conspicuously fail to take st. Paul seriously.3
Plantinga is faulted for, in effect, limiting the noetic effects of sin to unbelievers; Wolterstorff, on the other hand, goes astray in holding, with Reid,
that we have certain "innocent belief dispositions" whose outputs should
normally be taken as trustworthy. In both of these philosophers, "creation
does a full day's work, while the fall is only asked to put in a cameo appearance" (p. 215); neither takes Paul seriously.
What is noticeably lacking in this essay is any positive epistemological
program-any means by which, amid the general ruin, we might manage to
arrive at a few warranted beliefs. Westphal may be correct in thinking that
Plantinga tends to limit the noetic effects of sin to unbelievers, though the
passage he cites does not demonstrate this.4 And I do think Wolterstorff's
epistemology is overly "Edenic," at least in the essay cited. But Westphal
goes too far when he recommends "abandoning the idea that we naturally
have innocent beliefs or belief dispositions and adopting the principle that
our beliefs are guilty until proved innocent" (p. 217). As Westphal should
know, it is simply impossible to "prove our beliefs innocent" in the way this
would require; the outcome of the "guilty until proved innocent" principle
must be a pervasive scepticism. s
Or perhaps fideism. Westphal writes, paraphrasing Isaiah, "all our [noetically] righteous deeds are like a polluted garment," suggesting that he may
agree with Bultmann that, also in epistemology, justification is by faith
alone. 6 But if this sort of all-out fide ism is the result of Westphal's program,
we would be better off as epistemological Pelagians. It is possible, of course,
that Westphal does not intend this result. But the result may be inevitable,
whether intended or not. Once we employ the noetic effects of sin to launch
a general assault on human cognition, three outcomes are possible: We will
ourselves be buried in the general epistemological wreckage, we will (sinfully) exempt our own projects from the "principle of suspicion," or we will
appeal to divine inspiration, in which case we are no longer engaged in doing
philosophy. 7
It is clear that the essays in Christian Philosophy, like those in the earlier
Philosophy and the Christian Faith,S probe more deeply than is usual among
philosophers into what has been regarded as the distinctive territory of Christian theology. The boundary between theology and philosophy may not be
effaced entirely, but the Wall is down and traffic is moving freely back
and forth. At the conference at which these papers were delivered, Ralph
McInerny reflected on the oddity of theology done by philosophers and concluded, "God has indeed from these stones raised up children to Abraham."
May the stones speak on.
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NOTES

1. In a note (p. 86) Stump promises an essay which addresses "issues involving the
mechanisms of God's providence."

2. For a contrary view of the Lewis-Anscombe exchange, see Victor Reppert, "The
Lewis-Anscombe Controversy: A Discussion of the Issues," Christian Scholar s Review
XIX:I (September 1989), pp. 32-48.
3. The essays cited are Plantinga's "Reason and Belief in God" and Wolterstorff's "Can
Belief in God Be Rational If It Has No Foundations?"; both are contained in Faith and
Rationality: Reason alld Belief in God, ed. Alvin Plantinga and Nicholas Wolterstorff
(Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1983).
4. One might, more charitably, interpret Plantinga as holding that in the case of believers
the noetic effects of sin, while present, are counteracted by divine grace sufficiently to
permit our innate noetic dispositions to function more or less normally.
5. Westphal does, it is true, allow for exceptions in the case of "existentially peripheral"
beliefs such as those of mathematics. But it is hard to see how this can help; Westphal
clearly rejects the foundationalist strategy of basing our metaphysical and religious beliefs
on those other, less contaminated, areas of knowledge.
6. "The man who wishes to believe in God as his God must realize that he has nothing
in his hand on which to base his faith. He is suspended in mid-air, and cannot demand a
proof of the Word which addresses him. For the ground and object of faith are identical.
Security can be found only by abandoning aU security, by being ready, as Luther put it,
to plunge into the inner darkness" ("Bultmann Replies To His Critics," in Kerygma and
Myth, ed. Hans Werner Bartsch (New York: Harper and Row, 1961), p. 211).
7. Westphal writes, "Perhaps the notion of Christian philosophy makes sense after all,
not in terms of its propositional what but in terms of its prayerful how" (p. 220). A fine
sentiment, but oddly placed at the end of ten pages spent criticizing his fellow Christian
philosophers for accepting epistemological propositions which are not in accord with
Christian doctrine.
8. Thomas V. Morris, ed. (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1988).

Atheism: A Philosophical Justification, by Michael Martin. Philadelphia:
Temple University Press, 1990. Pp. xiii and 533.
JAMES A. KELLER, Wofford College.
Michael Martin's purpose, as his subtitle suggests, is to present a comprehensive philosophical justification for atheism. He realizes that this has been attempted before, but he believes that the case for atheism must be restated in light
of certain recent developments, including the appearance of some new arguments
for theism and revised statements of old arguments, as well as new replies to
arguments against the existence of God. Martin wants to respond to the most
important of these. His book and all of the literature to which he refers are
solidly within the analytic tradition of the philosophy of religion.

